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Abstract 
Most countries’ income tax systems entail a favourable treatment of homeownership, compared to 
rental-occupied housing. Such ‘homeownership bias’ and its consequences for a wide range of 
economic outcomes have long been recognized in the economic literature. Although a removal of 
the homeownership bias is generally advocated on efficiency grounds, its distributional implications 
are often neglected, especially in a cross country perspective. This paper aims to fill this gap by 
investigating the first order effects, in terms of distribution of income and work incentives, of 
removing the income tax provisions favouring homeownership. We consider six European countries 
– Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, who exhibit important 
variation in terms of income tax treatment of homeowners. Using the multi-country tax benefit 
model EUROMOD, we analyse the distributional consequences of including net imputed rent in the 
taxable income definition applying in each country, together with the removal of existing special tax 
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treatments of incomes or expenses related to the main residence; thus, we provide a measure of the 
homeownership bias. We implement three tax policy scenarios: in the first imputed rent is included 
in the taxable income of homeowners, while at the same time existing mortgage interest tax relief 
schemes and taxation of cadastral incomes are abolished. In two further revenue-neutral scenarios, 
the additional tax revenue raised through the taxation of imputed rent is redistributed to taxpayers, 
either through a tax rate reduction or a tax exemption increase. Results show how including net 
imputed rent in the tax base might affect inequality in each of the countries considered. Housing 
taxation appears to be a promising avenue for raising additional revenues, or lightening taxation of 
labour, with no inequality-increasing side-effects.  
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Policy points 
 In most countries, income tax systems treat implicit returns to homeownership favourably 
compared to income generated from rental-occupied housing, thus creating a 
‘homeownership bias’. 
 The economic literature presents arguments not only related to neutrality but also to equity 
and efficiency to remove this favourable treatment of homeowners. 
 Reforms in housing taxation that correct the homeownership bias can be a practicable way 
for governments to raise tax revenues without adverse effects on income inequality and 
work incentives. 
 Distributive and work incentive outcomes of a revenue-neutral housing tax reform crucially 
depend on how tax revenues are returned to tax payers. 
I. Introduction 
Most countries’ income tax systems treat homeownership favourably, compared to rental-occupied 
housing. This favourable treatment stems from different types of tax provisions: first and foremost, 
the income tax exemption of homeowners’ implicit return on the asset value of their residence. Both 
homeowners and renters consume housing services; however, homeowners do not deplete cash 
resources for these services, as renters do. In this respect, homeownership yields a return on 
investment i.e. figurative rental income. Rather than being taxed as any other form of investment, 
figurative rental income is generally exempt from income taxation, thus causing a bias towards 
homeowners and creating distortions in investment decisions. Additional income tax provisions 
favouring homeownership include tax reliefs linked to the cost of home ownership, such as tax 
credits or deductions allowed on mortgage interest payments, and the exemption of capital gains.  
Such ‘homeownership bias’ and its consequences for a wide range of economic outcomes, most 
notably in the housing and capital markets, have long been recognised in the economic literature 
(Aaron, 1970; Rosen, 1979; Poterba, 1992; Turnovsky and Okuyama, 1994). Arguments in favour of 
correcting this bias (e.g. through taxation of net imputed rent) are indeed quite old in economics as 
well as finance and political science (see, for example, Marsh, 1943; Goode, 1960; Musgrave, 1967; 
Vickrey, 1993).1 In addition to neutrality and efficiency arguments, distributional reasons for 
removing the homeownership bias have been put forward, such as horizontal equity between 
homeowners and renters2, and the fact that tax reliefs generally tend to favour higher income 
taxpayers, as the advantage depends on the homeowner’s marginal tax rate.  
                                                          
1
 However, a few authors argue in favour of keeping net imputed rent untaxed; see, for example, Bourassa and 
Grigsby (2000), on the grounds of the administrative infeasibility of accurate net imputed rent taxation and of 
the chance it might in fact result in a wealth tax.  
2
 Under imputed rent exemption, horizontal equity between owner occupiers and tenants would be achieved if 
tenants were also allowed a deduction on the rent paid; however, this is in practice generally not the case.  
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The financial crisis in the late 2000s has revived interest in housing taxation. The homeownership 
bias embedded in the US tax system is deemed responsible for fostering the housing bubble that 
triggered the crisis (IMF, 2009; Glaeser, 2010; Ceriani et al., 2011). At the same time, housing 
taxation has been in the spotlight in Europe as one of the few practicable ways of raising tax 
revenues while entailing less harmful consequences for efficiency and growth when compared to 
other forms of taxation. The possibility of shifting the income tax burden away from labour to an 
immovable tax base has made housing taxation a focus of several recent policy recommendations to 
EU countries (European Commission, 2012; 2013; Lloyd, 2009; Mirrlees et al., 2011). Although a 
removal of tax provisions favouring homeownership is generally advocated on efficiency grounds, its 
distributional implications are often neglected, especially in Europe, and in a cross country 
perspective3 (with the exception of Matsaganis and Flevotomou (2007a), who quantify the 
distributional impact of mortgage interest tax relief in five European countries). When considering 
the effects of potential tax reforms aimed at reducing the homeownership bias, one concern is that 
income inequality might be adversely affected, for example, in countries where older people, who 
are often overrepresented among homeowners, live on lower cash incomes than the rest of 
population (see e.g. Yates, 1994).  
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this literature by investigating the first order effects, in 
terms of distribution of income and work incentives, of addressing the homeownership bias in 
income taxation in a comparative setting. While the more general issue concerning the appropriate 
taxation of housing, (e.g. as both an investment and a consumption good, in a single-period versus a 
multi-period framework etc.) remains a highly contentious topic4 (Mirrlees et al., 2011), as such 
beyond the scope of this work, in what follows we focus on income taxation in a single-period 
framework, and adopt the investment perspective to housing. Owner-occupied housing is regarded 
as an asset yielding a return, imputed rental income, which is included in the income tax base. We 
consider six European countries – Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom – as a cross-country perspective provides a stronger basis for generalising the results. 
Naturally, the first-order effects depend on the combination of a number of factors, such as the 
share of imputed rent beneficiaries in the population and their location in the distribution of 
disposable income, the progressivity of income taxation and the treatment of mortgage interest 
payments in the existing baseline tax system. The countries considered in our analysis differ greatly 
in these respects and are chosen for this reason. Moreover, estimates of imputed rent that have 
been calculated precisely with the aim of international comparison are available for these countries 
(Frick et al., 2010).  
                                                          
3
 National studies include Hills (1991) who estimates the distributional effects of subsidies to public sector 
tenants and tax concessions to owner occupiers in the UK; Clark and Leicester (2004) who consider the effect 
of abolishing mortgage interest tax relief on income inequality, also in the UK; and Anderson and Gosh Roy 
(2001) who analyse the distributional impact of the removal of mortgage interest and local property tax 
deductibility in the US.  
4
 As discussed in Mirrlees et al. (2011), besides representing a form of investment, housing could also be 
regarded as a durable consumption good. This second perspective would call for a residence-based form of 
taxation levied on occupiers, irrespective of whether homeowners or renters, which would neither correct nor 
worsen the homeownership bias in income taxation. 
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Given this diversity in institutional and contextual settings, our analysis can provide insights into the 
likely implications of changes across a variety of policy environments. Using the multi-country tax 
benefit model EUROMOD, we assess the distributional consequences of including imputed rent in 
the taxable income definition applying in each country. Imputed rent is considered net of the main 
costs of homeownership such as the payment of mortgage interest. Taxation of net imputed rent in 
our policy simulations is accompanied by the removal of existing special tax treatments of incomes 
or expenses related to the main residence to avoid the chance of double taxation or double tax 
concession. We implement three tax policy scenarios. In the first, non revenue-neutral scenario, we 
add net imputed rent to cash income components in the personal income tax bases. The results 
provide evidence of a small inequality-reducing effect of net imputed rent taxation, consistent 
across countries. We then consider two further scenarios in which the additional revenues arising 
from net imputed rent taxation are returned to taxpayers through revenue-neutral reforms. In our 
simulations, net imputed rent taxation appears to be pro-rich when accompanied by a tax rate 
reduction; while an increase in a tax exemption reduces inequality, with gainers mostly situated in 
the middle of the income distribution. Work incentives in general decrease when imputed rent is 
taxed due to the progressivity of the tax systems, but this effect is largely counteracted in the 
budget-neutral scenarios.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we discuss the economic principles 
underpinning the inclusion of net imputed rent in the definition of taxable income. The micro-
simulation model, the net imputed rent measure and the details for the alternative tax policy 
simulations are presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides the empirical results, showing the likely 
first-order distributional effects of our three scenarios, and discussing how these might be affected 
by price and behavioural adjustments, through their feedback effect in the housing market, and by 
changes in work incentives due to the shift of taxation from labour income to property. Section 5 
concludes. 
II. The homeownership bias in income taxation  
The economic rationale for the taxation of net imputed rent together with other incomes relates to 
the ‘comprehensive income taxation’ view that an appropriate income tax base should reflect all 
those resources that contribute to enhancing an individual’s consumption possibilities (Haig, 1921; 
Simons, 1938), taken as a measure of ‘ability to pay’. Any non-monetary income that increases 
consumption possibilities, while leaving unaffected the original capital stock, should therefore be 
reflected in taxable income. Imputed rent (net of mortgage interest payments and other owner 
occupier costs), which enhances homeowners’ consumption possibilities because they benefit from 
housing services they would otherwise need to pay for, thus depleting cash resources, is an example. 
In this sense, net imputed rent is regarded as part of the net return on the housing investment, and 
as such, neutrality and efficiency principles recommend that it is taxed in an equivalent way to other 
forms of returns from investment (Mirrlees et al., 2011) to avoid creating distortions in the 
allocation of capital, imposing a deadweight loss to society (Skinner, 1996). The inclusion of net 
imputed rent in taxable income, so that homeowners and renters endowed with the same (or 
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higher) consumption possibilities bear the same (or higher) taxation burden, is one approach to 
making sure that horizontal and vertical equity principles are respected.  
When considering the actual housing taxation policies found in western economies, a sharp 
disconnect between principles and practice is observed. Although the tax treatment of housing takes 
numerous forms and varies considerably across countries, in most cases the imputed rent enjoyed 
by owner-occupied households is exempt from income taxation; in the few countries where it is 
subject to income tax, the corresponding notional rents are usually substantially lower than private 
market rents (Andrews, Caldera Sánchez and Johansson, 2011). Such provisions result in a 
favourable tax treatment for homeowners, who see a return on investment largely untaxed. The 
favourable treatment they enjoy is also reinforced by the fact that in many countries there are 
mortgage interest tax relief policies, although more recently several countries are moving towards 
phasing out such measures. Clearly, the homeownership bias inherent in income taxation represents 
a common trait across different country-specific housing taxation practices5 and helps to explain why 
homeownership rates have risen quite steadily in nearly all OECD countries since the mid-1980s 
(Andrews, Caldera Sánchez and Johansson, 2011).  
The main argument usually put in favour of promoting homeownership is that it creates positive 
externalities because homeowners tend to take more interest in the community than renters (Di 
Pasquale and Glaeser, 1999). Moreover, existing tax measures often result from political attempts to 
influence voters (Ball, 1983) as housing taxation is highly unpopular. Mortgage interest relief has 
been sustained as benefitting young and educated middle-class voters (see e.g. Matsaganis and 
Flevotomou, 2007b). The latter, together with housing taxation salience (Chetty, Looney and Croft, 
2009), may explain the difficulties encountered by a number of governments in their efforts to 
withdraw policies favouring homeownership vis-à-vis other forms of housing tenure (Wood, 1990; 
Arnold et al., 2011).  
The homeownership bias has non-trivial potential consequences. These include overinvestment in 
housing and displacement of other more productive forms of investment (Turnovsky and Okuyama, 
1994); restricted residential and, hence, labour market mobility (Bover, Muellbauer and Murphy, 
1989; Cameron and Muellbauer, 1998; Boeri and Terrell, 2002); as well as increased house price 
volatility, leading to macroeconomic instability (Catte et al., 2004). Last but not least, undesirable 
distributional outcomes (Kneller, Bleany and Gemmell, 1999; Johansson et al., 2008; Arnold et al., 
2011) might arise under progressive tax systems as provisions like imputed rent exemption and 
mortgage interest relief tend to benefit disproportionally higher income taxpayers, who face higher 
marginal tax rates (Anderson and Gosh Roy, 2001; Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2007a; Poterba and 
Sinai, 2008; Andrews and Caldera Sánchez, 2011). Nevertheless, as Yates (1994) points out the 
results of imputed rent taxation may not necessarily be progressive, since in many countries the 
elderly are overrepresented both among homeowners and the poor.  
                                                          
5
 In several countries, property taxes are levied on owned occupied housing, potentially compensating for the 
homeownership bias inherent in income taxation. However, property taxes might embody wealth taxation 
being imposed on top of income taxation, and as such could be regarded as a complement, rather than a 
substitute to housing income taxation. Besides, as the revenues collected from recurrent property taxation 
represent a small portion of tax revenues, generally property taxes do not fully compensate the bias inherent 
in income taxation. 
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FIGURE 1 
Distribution of the population according to housing tenure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Total: total population. Q1 – Q5: household equivalised disposable cash income quintile groups. See Table 3 for data 
sources.  
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD version D25.  
 
As to their housing related income tax treatments, the six selected countries represent no exception 
to the homeownership bias pattern found in western economies, even though they present striking 
differences in their housing market structure, as is evident from Figure 1. In Belgium, Greece, Italy, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom the majority of the population lives in owned 
accommodation, while in Germany most of the population lives in rented dwellings. In Italy and, 
particularly, in Greece, the majority of the population lives in residences owned outright, while in 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom most of the homeowners still have mortgage loans 
outstanding. Figure 1 also shows tenure status across income quintiles (Q1: poorest, ... Q5: richest), 
with population members ranked according to their equivalised disposable household cash income. 
In all countries the higher the quintile the higher the share of the population living in 
accommodation owned on a mortgage and the lower the share of those living in rented housing. In 
most countries the share of those living in property owned outright is relatively stable across 
quintiles.  
In none of the six countries is net imputed rent fully taxed, as detailed in Table 1. While entirely 
exempted in Germany and the United Kingdom, cadastral income6 is part of taxable income in 
Belgium and Italy but even then can be (almost) entirely deducted; in Greece only part of the 
imputed rent of larger dwellings is taxed, affecting relatively few households; in the Netherlands a 
                                                          
6
 Cadastral income is a notional income from housing whose computation is based on property value registries 
(often obsolete). The lack of regular updating of property values typically results in cadastral income being 
significantly lower than the current market values of housing would suggest.  
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(small) fraction of the market value of the dwelling is included in taxable income. Mortgage interest 
tax relief exists in four out of the six countries included in our analysis.  
TABLE 1 
Housing taxation policies for the principal dwelling of homeowners 
  
BE 
2003 
DE 
2001 
GR 
2004 
IT 
2003 
NL 
2001 
UK 
2003 
Taxation of 
imputed 
rent 
Cadastral income 
included in taxable 
income but 
(almost) fully 
deductible.  
No 
Cadastral income of 
dwellings larger than 
200 m
2
 
Cadastral income 
included in 
taxable income, 
but fully 
deductible 
Imputed rent up to 
0.55% of market 
value of the dwelling 
included in taxable 
income. 
No 
Mortgage 
interest 
tax relief 
Yes. Fully 
deductible.  
No 
Yes. Tax allowance 
for loans taken up 
before 2003. Tax 
credit of 20% of 
annual interest for 
loans after 2002. 
Yes. Tax credit 
equal to 19% with 
maximum of 
€760. 
Yes. Fully 
deductible. 
No 
Note: Policy reference year (shown under country acronyms) reflects the reference period for subsequent simulations. 
Source: EUROMOD Country Reports Andrews, Caldera Sánchez and Johansson (2011).  
 
Table 2 offers a quantitative picture of the extent to which such policy provisions favour owner 
occupiers, with respect to same-ability-to-pay tenant occupiers7. The favourable treatment is 
computed as the difference, under existing tax provisions, in the tax burden borne by owner 
occupiers and that borne by ‘otherwise identical’, in terms of ability to pay, tenant occupiers. The set 
of same-ability-to-pay tenants is constructed so that the two groups present the same distribution of 
characteristics (e.g. household composition, type of accommodation) relevant to quantify their 
ability to pay, or command over resources. In the case of tenants, this corresponds to their cash 
income. In the case of owner occupiers, this is measured by their ‘extended income’, i.e. cash 
income plus net imputed rent8 (for the derivation of the imputed rent measure see Section 3.2), 
corresponding to their consumption possibility set. Horizontal equity, that is equal treatment of 
equals (Feldstein, 1976; Plotnick, 1982), would require levying the same tax on homeowners and 
renters endowed with the same command over resources.9 If this was the case, no difference 
between homeowners and same-ability-to-pay renters should be registered. However, figures 
presented in Table 2 show how under existing tax provisions, a considerable degree of horizontal 
inequity emerges in these six countries. On average, homeowners clearly pay lower taxes than those 
renters enjoying the same consumption possibility set, with differences in average tax rates ranging 
from about 1 percentage point in Germany and the United Kingdom, up to about 3 percentage 
points in the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. To put it differently: in four out of the six countries, the 
                                                          
7
 The reported figures have been derived using EUROMOD, which is presented in Section 3. 
8
 To enhance cross-county comparability, and because in the calculation of net imputed rent, mortgage 
interest paid is already subtracted, in this exercise existing mortgage interest tax reliefs have been abolished to 
avoid double counting.  
9
 Alternatively, one could think of this as comparing the existing tax treatment of homeowners with what they 
would pay in taxes as if they were landlords (assuming their imputed rent from owner occupied housing 
corresponded to the rental income). For example, Poterba and Sinai (2008) present their analysis this way. 
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average tax burden for tenants exceeds that of homeowners by between 6% in Germany and more 
than 40% in the Netherlands and Greece. While the tax exemption of net imputed rent generates 
some bias in every country, cross-country heterogeneity in the size of the homeownership bias 
relates partly to the presence (or otherwise) and importance of the existing mortgage interest tax 
relief: there is none in Germany and the United Kingdom, while it is substantial in the three 
countries where the homeownership bias is highest.  
TABLE 2 
Average tax rate for owner occupiers and tenant with the same ability-to-pay (as a share of gross 
extended income) 
 
 
Owner occupiers 
(a) 
Tenant with the same-ability-to pay  
(b) 
Difference 
= (b) - (a) 
BE 16.8 19.3 2.5 
DE 14.6 15.5 0.9 
GR 3.9 5.7 1.8 
IT 13.9 16.5 2.6 
NL 8.6 12.2 3.6 
UK 13.0 14.1 1.1 
Note: Homeowners in the dataset are compared with a simulated set of same ability-to-pay renters.  
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD version D25 with net imputed rent estimates as in Frick et al. (2010). 
 
In what follows, we estimate the first-order distributional effects of addressing the homeownership 
bias by including net imputed rent in taxable income in these six European countries. 
 III. Methodology and simulations 
1. EUROMOD: a multi-country tax benefit model 
To assess the impact of alternative tax policy options we simulate counterfactual scenarios by using 
a fiscal microsimulation approach which allows us to estimate household incomes under different 
tax options holding everything else constant and, therefore, avoiding endogeneity problems 
(Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006).  
The policy reform simulations are performed on the income survey micro-data as detailed in Table 3, 
using EUROMOD, the multi-country European wide tax-benefit microsimulation model. EUROMOD 
simulates tax liabilities (direct taxes and social insurance contributions) and cash benefit 
entitlements for the household populations of EU Member States in a comparable way across 
countries on the basis of the tax-benefit rules in place and information available in the underlying 
datasets. The components of the tax-benefit systems which are not simulated due to lack of 
information on previous employment and contribution history in the cross-sectional survey data 
used as input of EUROMOD (e.g. contributory pensions), as well as market incomes, are taken 
directly from the data. EUROMOD is a static model in the sense that the arithmetic simulation of 
taxes and benefits abstract from potential behavioural reactions of individuals. As such, EUROMOD 
is of value in terms of assessing the first order effects of tax-benefit policies and in understanding 
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how tax-benefit policy reforms may affect income distribution, work incentives and government 
budgets in a partial equilibrium. For further information, see Sutherland (2007) and Sutherland and 
Figari (2013). 
The tax-benefit systems simulated in this paper refer to 2001 for Germany and the Netherlands, 
2003 for Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom, and 2004 for Greece. The reference time period for 
income data matches the policy year with the only exception of the Netherlands for which monetary 
values have been updated (from 2000 to 2001) according to the appropriate price and income 
indices. The simulations of these policy systems have been cross-checked with administrative 
statistics10 and tested through a number of other applications (e.g. Bargain, 2007; Dolls, Fuest and 
Peichl, 2012; Bargain, Orsini and Peichl, 2014).  
 
TABLE 3 
Data sources, methods used to estimate imputed rents and policy years used in the simulations 
  BE DE GR IT NL UK 
Dataset - year 
Statistics on 
Income and 
Living 
Conditions 
(EU-SILC) 2004 
German 
Socio 
Economic 
Panel 
(GSOEP) 
2002 
Household 
Budget 
Survey 
(HBS)  
 
2004/05 
Statistics on 
Income and 
Living 
Conditions 
(IT-SILC) 
 2004 
Socio-
Economic 
Panel 
(SEP) 
 
2001 
Family 
Resources 
Survey 
(FRS) 
 
2003/04 
Method to estimate IR OC-R (H) OC-R (H) OC-R (H) OC-R CM OC-R 
n (individuals) 12,971 16,108 17,386 60,734 10,344 67,123 
n (households) 5,275 11,194 6,555 24,204 4,329 28,860 
N (individuals in million) 10.4 78.5 10.9 57.1 15.5 58.5 
N (households in million) 4.4 38.7 4.0 23.2 6.9 25.2 
Policy years  2003 2001 2004 2003 2001 2003 
Aggregate tax revenue 
on income (million €) 32,182 199,073 8,013 133,130 27,583 102,917 
Notes: Method to estimate Imputed Rent (IR): OC-R = Opportunity Cost Approach, regression based including Heckman 
selection model (H) or not; CM = Capital Market Approach. Aggregate tax revenue on income (million €) is expressed as 
million £ in the UK: aggregate statistics are in line with OECD Revenue Statistics (2006).  
 
2. A measure of net imputed rent 
Original data sources for EUROMOD input data do not contain imputed rent values. These have been 
estimated and added to the EUROMOD input database by Frick et al. (2010). Their cross-country 
comparable measure of net imputed rent, i.e. the value of living in owner-occupied housing, used 
here is to our knowledge currently the best available set of estimates for international comparative 
purposes.11  
                                                          
10
 The results have been documented in EUROMOD Country Reports, available at 
https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/using-euromod/country-reports  
11
 The EU-SILC database (i.e. EUROMOD input data for some countries), in principle, provides estimates of 
gross and net imputed rent. However, as Juntto and Reijo (2010) indicate, these suffer from lack of 
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The cross-country empirical literature (Frick and Grabka, 2003; Frick, Goebel and Grabka, 2007; Frick 
et al., 2010; Törmälehto and Sauli, 2013) proposes three methods for the estimation of the value of 
imputed rent on the basis of micro data: the opportunity cost approach, the capital market approach 
and the self-assessment approach. The capital market approach (or ‘user cost method’) considers 
the alternative uses to which the capital invested in housing could have been put, assuming that the 
implicit rate of return on housing equity is equivalent to a relatively safe private market rate of 
return on an equal value of investment (such as a long-term government bond). The self-assessment 
approach is based on the assessment of respondents of the rental value of their home. A 
disadvantage of both methods is that they are based on a subjective valuation of the homeowners’ 
property. The opportunity cost approach instead seeks to explain the rents paid by existing renters 
for different quality homes and uses this model to predict the likely rental value of owner-occupied 
properties. 
In all three approaches, relevant costs need to be deducted in order to obtain the required net 
imputed rent. Relevant costs include operating and maintenance (excluding heating) costs and the 
costs linked to ownership such as mortgage interest payments and property taxes.  
We use the estimates of net imputed rent which were derived in the framework of the AIM-AP 
project and presented in Frick et al. (2010). They used the opportunity cost approach (also known as 
the rental equivalence method) to estimate imputed rents in a non-subsidised rental market (see 
also Frick and Grabka, 2003; Frick, Goebel and Grabka, 2007). This is done through a hedonic 
regression estimation using a two-step procedure. In the first step, Frick et al. (2010) estimated a 
regression model with rent as the dependent variable (normalised for the size of residence, if 
possible) based on the population of tenants in the private market. The covariates included 
characteristics of the dwelling that are indicative about its quality and market value: type and age of 
accommodation, availability of particular amenities, number of rooms, regional and/or locality 
dummies.12 In order to account for the fact that different types of individuals might live in rented 
or owned houses, this approach includes a correction for selection bias through a Heckman 
procedure.13 The resulting coefficients were used to predict gross imputed rent for the set of 
homeowners. Given the very small unsubsidised private rental market in the Netherlands, the 
opportunity cost approach could not be used for this country and, hence, the capital market 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
comparability across countries. Törmälehto and Sauli (2013) indicate that there is still considerable lack of 
transparency in this respect in the most recent waves of SILC. 
12
 In the UK, dummy variables for the council tax band are included to capture otherwise unobserved variation 
in housing values. Council tax band was chosen as, while being a house-level variable, as such less subject to 
the chance of endogeneity bias, it is closely related to the value of the property. In the other countries, where 
such an indicator was not available, household-level equivalised disposable income was used instead as a 
proxy for the unobserved quality of the dwelling. Income was not included in the regression for the UK as, 
once the council tax band was controlled for, its inclusion would not have entailed an increase in explanatory 
power (as measured by the adjusted R-squared), while implying instead an increased scope for endogeneity 
bias. 
13
 In the case of Italy and the United Kingdom, the Heckman correction term was not statistically significant. In 
Belgium, Germany and Greece, a set of characteristics have been used for the exclusion restrictions in the 
Heckman selection, notably education level and migrant background of the head of the household.  
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approach was applied.14 Information on the data sources, sample sizes and preferred method for the 
estimation of imputed rent is summarised in Table 3. More detailed information on the estimation of 
imputed rent for each country is available in Frick et al. (2010).15 
We use the net imputed rent, i.e. after deducting related expenses, to derive the 'extended income 
distribution'; that is the distribution of disposable income augmented by the net imputed rent. Table 
4 shows how homeowners’ equivalised disposable income would change were net imputed rent 
included in the income concept. The value of living in owner-occupied housing is substantial as, on 
average, it ranges from 7 per cent (Belgium) to 13 per cent (Greece) of disposable cash income. The 
advantage is more important for outright owners than for those with a mortgage as the net gain (in 
absolute terms) is smaller for the latter group once mortgage interest payments are deducted. 
Furthermore, current disposable income is likely to differ between the two groups of owners as 
people with a mortgage are typically in the prime working age group and at the peak of their current 
earnings, while a greater proportion of outright owners have retired and hence have lower current 
income. This is confirmed by Figure 1 showing that outright owners are spread relatively evenly 
across the income distribution while a larger proportion of those with a mortgage can be found in 
the upper income quintiles. Hence, even if imputed rent was similar in absolute terms for outright 
owners and those on mortgage, it would be presumably larger relative to their cash income for 
outright owners. For the small group of outright owners in the Netherlands net imputed rent 
amounts to 20 per cent of disposable income.  
TABLE 4 
Change in equivalent disposable income (in %) due to inclusion of net imputed rent 
  BE DE GR IT NL UK 
 All owners 7% 10% 13% 11% 8% 9% 
- Owner outright 9% 16% 15% 11% 20% 18% 
- Owner on mortgage 6% 4% 8% 10% 7% 6% 
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD version D25 with net imputed rent estimates as in Frick et al. (2010). 
 
3. Alternative policy simulations 
According to the Haig-Simons tax base definition, the net imputed rent should be taxed as a return 
on capital investment and included in the tax base of the personal income tax. Alternatively, it can 
be taxed separately, as would be the case in a dual income tax system. We follow the first approach 
in order to provide an upper bound of the likely distributional effects.16 The first simulation includes 
                                                          
14
 This was done using an interest rate of 3% - the most common rate used in empirical studies based on this 
approach. A comparison of the implementation of the opportunity cost approach and the capital market 
approach in Germany (Frick, Goebel and Grabka, 2007) and in five European countries (Frick et al., 2010) 
indicates that the choice of method for estimating imputed rent does not substantially affect the distributive 
outcomes. Consequently, we do not expect that using a different estimation method for the Netherlands 
would significantly affect the qualitative results of our paper. 
15
 See also the AIM-AP project https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/research/projects. 
16 Following the economic literature (Mirrlees et al., 2011) and the main options discussed in the policy debate 
(European Commission, 2012) we propose taxing the owner-occupied housing as a return on capital 
investment. We do not modify existing property taxes because in the countries considered in the analysis, in 
the early 2000s, they were regarded as taxes with different purposes and based on different concepts of tax 
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net imputed rent in the personal income tax base, irrespective of budget neutrality (IR1). In addition, 
we analyse two budget neutral scenarios (IR2 and IR3) which, in effect, seek to shift part of the tax 
burden from cash income to net imputed rent.  
Net imputed rent included in the taxable income, no revenue neutrality (IR1) 
First, we use EUROMOD to simulate a scenario in which the estimated net imputed rent is included 
in the taxable income definition for homeowners.17 As a consequence, the net imputed rent is taxed 
at least at the same marginal tax rate that individuals face under the current income tax system. To 
make the simulations coherent across countries, we avoid any double taxation and double tax 
expenditures related to imputed rent and house purchasing costs. First, we exclude from the tax 
base any existing amount of cadastral income. Second, as the full deduction of mortgage costs is 
already part of the net imputed rent calculation, we abolish any existing mortgage interest tax reliefs 
(present in all countries but Germany and the United Kingdom, see Table 1). This scenario removes 
the horizontal inequities between homeowners and renters, as residence occupiers, and also 
enhances vertical equity since individuals with higher consumption possibilities related to the 
homeownership bear higher taxation burden relative to the baseline. The treatment of housing costs 
by other parts of the tax-benefit system (e.g. the coverage of mortgage costs by some social 
assistance benefits) has not been amended as our focus here is on the inclusion of income from 
housing, net of costs, in the base of personal income tax.  
Revenue neutrality through a tax rate reduction (IR2) and a tax exemption increase (IR3) 
We also simulate two revenue neutral scenarios in which the additional tax revenue raised from 
homeowners through the taxation of imputed rent is returned to all income taxpayers, irrespective 
of their tenure status. This will shift the income tax burden from cash income (mainly labour income) 
to imputed rent and from tenants to owners. We follow two different approaches to guarantee 
revenue neutrality, which resemble realistic policy alternatives. Under the first approach (IR2), 
taxpayers enjoy a uniform cut in all income tax rates. Operationally, this is implemented by a 
proportional reduction in their income tax liability. This means that the extra tax revenue raised is 
given back as a tax rebate proportional to the (pre-rebate) tax liability when including net imputed 
rents. Thus, it is only given to those with positive personal income tax liability after taxing imputed 
rents (IR1). Under the second revenue neutral approach (IR3), taxpayers enjoy an increase in the tax 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
base. For example, in Italy the Local Property Tax (ICI) was mainly considered as a charge paid for the provision 
of local public services (OECD, 2012). In the United Kingdom, the Council Tax combines features of a property 
tax with other functions. When combined with the specific benefit designed to provide a rebate for low 
income households, it is in fact a hybrid of a poll tax, household tax and income tax as well as a property tax 
(Hills and Sutherland, 1991). Moreover, in most of the countries considered in this paper, property taxes in the 
reference period of the paper represented only a very small share of taxes (see e.g. OECD, 2009; Andrews et 
al., 2011). 
17
 Due to lack of information on the individuals owning the accommodation, the whole amount of the imputed 
rent has been allocated to the person with the highest taxable income. This means that imputed rent is taxed 
at the highest marginal rate, an option that could be imposed by the tax authorities, especially if they want to 
maximise tax receipts. Hence, the results presented here should be interpreted as showing the upper bound of 
the likely distributional effects. Naturally, including imputed rent in the tax base of the person with the lower 
taxable income would generate smaller impacts than those presented here.  
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exemption. This corresponds to a non-refundable lump sum tax credit assigned to all taxpayers 
(again, all those with positive income tax after including net imputed rents). This means that the 
extra tax revenue raised is given back as an equal tax credit to all taxpayers (resulting negative taxes 
have been set to 0). In the case of Germany, where husband and wife are taxed jointly, the rebate is 
given in proportion to each spouse’s share of the tax base under IR2. Under IR3, both husband and 
wife receive the tax credit, if they each individually contribute to the joint tax base. Revenue 
neutrality is imposed in terms of government budget (i.e. the net effect of both income tax and cash 
benefits). This approach allows social assistance and other income-tested schemes to at least partly 
compensate higher taxes, in those counties where income tests are based on net income. 
The paper focuses on the first-order fiscal and distributional effect of the tax reforms. We also 
provide an indication of the effects on work incentives by presenting marginal effective tax rates.18 
In the medium and longer run, other effects might take place in the labour, housing, or financial 
markets. While an analysis of these is undoubtedly beyond the scope of the paper, feedback effects 
in the housing market, and their likely distributional effect are briefly discussed based on existing 
literature.  
IV. Distributional and fiscal effects of including imputed rent in 
taxable income  
1. First-order distributive and fiscal effects 
Table 5 reports the effect of taxing net imputed rent while replacing all existing special tax 
treatments of incomes and expenses related to homeownership (IR1) on three aggregates: the gross 
taxable income (i.e. taxable income before application of tax allowances and deductions), the 
income tax revenues collected by the government and the extended disposable income of the 
population (that is, disposable income after the inclusion of net imputed rent in the income 
concept). Gross taxable income increases considerably when it includes net imputed rent: the 
change is between 5 per cent (Germany) and 8 per cent (Greece) except in the Netherlands where 
gross taxable income increases by 2 per cent as part of the imputed rent is already taxed in the 
existing system. Income tax revenues also rise substantially in all countries under examination. The 
proportional changes are larger where the existing mortgage interest tax relief is very important (the 
Netherlands: +27 per cent)19 or the income taxes currently collected relatively low (Greece: +24 per 
cent). At the other extreme, the proportional increase in income tax is smaller in the two countries 
without an existing mortgage interest tax relief, namely Germany (+6 per cent) and the United 
Kingdom (+9 per cent). Moreover, the high share of market rented accommodation in Germany 
results in relatively few enjoying imputed rent. In the United Kingdom tax rates are relatively low 
and a number of older beneficiaries of net imputed rent are below the tax threshold. 
                                                          
18
 The implications of the changes in returns to savings due to the imputed rent taxation on present and future 
consumption and work are out of scope of the present paper; it would require a dynamic economic modelling 
setup. 
19
 A study for the Netherlands estimates indeed that the value of mortgage interest tax relief amounts to 
around a fifth of personal income tax receipts (see Studiecommissie Belastingstelsel, 2010). 
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TABLE 5 
Fiscal effects of including imputed rent in gross income (IR1) 
  
Proportional change in 
Gross Taxable 
Income 
Personal Income 
Tax Revenue 
Extended disposable 
Income 
BE 6.4% 13.9% -3.4% 
DE 4.9% 5.8% -1.1% 
GR 7.8% 24.2% -2.3% 
IT 6.7% 13.2% -2.9% 
NL 2.3% 27.1% -4.2% 
UK 7.0% 9.5% -1.6% 
Notes: Net imputed rent included in gross taxable income, no revenue neutrality (IR1). ‘Gross taxable income’ is taxable 
income before any deduction.  
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD version D25 with net imputed rent estimates as in Frick et al. (2010). 
 
Cross-country differences in the reduction in extended disposable income due to taxing net imputed 
rent are remarkable. The change in extended disposable income is relatively small in the two 
countries without existing mortgage interest tax relief, Germany (-1.1 per cent) and the United 
Kingdom (-1.6 per cent). In contrast, the change in extended disposable income is considerable in 
the Netherlands (-4.2 per cent) where the existing mortgage interest tax relief is very important (see 
also Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2007a); as well as in Belgium (-3.4 per cent) and Italy (-2.9 per 
cent) where homeownership is widespread. Homeownership is also widespread in Greece, but the 
change in extended disposable income is smaller (-2.3 per cent) since many of the homeowners have 
low incomes and remain under the (relatively high) tax threshold even after the inclusion of net 
imputed rent in the concept of taxable income. 
 
Figure 2 shows the average additional amount (expressed in equivalised PPP euros) that 
homeowners have to pay in taxes under scenario IR1, by quintile of equivalent disposable cash 
income. This additional tax liability corresponds to the removal of horizontal inequity between 
homeowners and tenants, meaning that homeowners are now taxed at the same rate as the 
simulated same ability-to-pay renters (i.e. differing in terms of their tenure status, but not in terms 
of consumption possibilities)20. Horizontal inequities, expressed in absolute terms, appear to be 
monotonically increasing in income in all countries. The tax bonus under current policies that 
homeowners enjoy, compared to otherwise identical tenants, ranges from the equivalent of about 
20 to 40 PPP euros per month in the bottom income quintile to about 75 PPP euros per month in the 
top income quintile in Italy and Greece, and to about 100 PPP euros per month in Belgium, Denmark, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
                                                          
20
 This corresponds to removing the difference in the average tax rates of owner occupiers and tenants with 
the same ability-to-pay presented in Table 2. 
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FIGURE 2 
Homeowners’ increase in tax liability (IR 1) that removes horizontal inequity 
 
Note: Q1 – Q5: household equivalised disposable cash income quintile groups.  
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD version D25 with net imputed rent estimates as in Frick et al. (2010). 
 
The figures reported in Table 5 – particularly those in the second column showing the increase in tax 
revenue – suggest that it is rather unrealistic to expect that imputed rent will be taxed without any 
significant accompanying reduction in taxes. Therefore, we also consider two revenue-neutral policy 
alternatives. In the first scenario, revenue neutrality is achieved through a tax rate reduction for all 
taxpayers (IR2). In the second scenario, neutrality is achieved through a tax exemption increase for 
everybody (IR3). Naturally, these policies are likely to have very different distributional effects, since 
net imputed rent is likely to be more equally distributed than tax liabilities. Note that these revenue 
neutral scenarios do not change horizontal equity compared to scenario IR1, as taxes are reduced in 
both IR2 and IR3 in the same way for all tax payers (i.e. homeowners and tenants alike).  
A first indication of the direction of the vertical equity effects is provided in Figure 3, which shows 
the share of gainers and losers per quintile as we move from the baseline distribution of extended 
disposable income (i.e. including net imputed rent) to the distribution of extended disposable 
income resulting from the three tax reform scenarios. As can be expected, the first scenario (IR1) 
results almost exclusively in losers (Figure 3a), ranging from 18 per cent of all households (Germany, 
with the lowest share of net imputed rent beneficiaries) to 56 per cent (Belgium).21 In all countries, 
the share of losers increases with income level (apart from the top quintile in the UK, to a small 
                                                          
21
 The few gainers observed in some countries benefit from the replacement of the existing tax instruments 
with the inclusion of the net imputed rent in taxable income. 
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extent, due to the much higher extended disposable income at the top of the distribution). In 
Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands, the share of losers is higher than 70 per cent in the top 
quintile. This pattern follows on the one hand from the fact that the share of homeowners (and 
hence, net imputed rent beneficiaries) increases with income and, on the other hand, that existing 
tax deductions such as mortgage interest tax relief, are relatively more beneficial to higher incomes. 
The budgetary neutral scenario IR2 offers a completely different picture (Figure 3b): in Belgium and 
Italy, losers are relatively more prominent at the lower end of the income distribution, while in 
Germany, Greece and the Netherlands, the share of losers is higher in the upper end of the income 
distribution. With respect to the share of gainers, a similar pattern emerges for all countries: their 
share increases with income level. In the top quintile, the share of gainers ranges from 40 per cent 
(Greece) to 60 per cent (Belgium). As tax liabilities are reduced in a proportional way, the tax system 
becomes relatively less progressive, i.e. it implies a relatively greater advantage higher up the 
income distribution. Thus, part of the progressive pattern found in IR1 is mitigated by this tax 
reduction. 
When revenue neutrality is achieved through a tax exemption increase (budgetary neutral scenario 
IR3), the share of losers increases with income in all countries (Figure 3c). Contrary to the previous 
scenario, this should result in a relatively higher advantage for lower incomes compared to higher 
incomes, as the lump sum amount represents a higher share of income in relative terms. This is 
indeed what we observe, though with variation across countries. The pattern of gainers is rather 
mixed: in most countries the bottom quintile has relatively few gainers (or losers), since in many 
countries a considerable proportion of their members have incomes too low to pay personal income 
taxes. In most countries, gainers are concentrated in the middle of the income distribution. Only in 
the Netherlands we find a declining share of gainers when moving up the income distribution, while 
an increasing but less pronounced pattern can be observed in Greece.  
FIGURE 3 
Share of gainers and losers per quintile when net imputed rent is treated as taxable income 
(a) IR1: no revenue neutrality 
 
(b) IR2: revenue neutrality through a tax rate reduction 
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(c) IR3: revenue neutrality through a tax exemption increase 
 
Notes: Gainers and losers defined as households with a percentage variation in extended disposable income equal to ±1%. 
Quintile groups defined on the basis of household equivalised disposable cash income.  
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD version D25 with net imputed rent estimates as in Frick et al. (2010). 
 
Another perspective is offered in Figure 4 which reports proportional changes in average extended 
disposable income per quintile. Figure 4a shows changes in extended disposable income when there 
is no revenue neutrality (i.e. IR1). In all countries, this policy results in larger reductions of income for 
higher income groups (except for the top two quintiles in the United Kingdom and the top quintile in 
Italy). This pattern is most pronounced in Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece. 
Figure 4b reports the corresponding changes when revenue neutrality is achieved through a tax rate 
reduction for all taxpayers (IR2). In general, extended income increases most strongly (around 1 per 
cent for most countries) in the top quintile, while it declines in the three or four bottom quintiles. In 
Germany, the changes are not very pronounced.  
Figure 4c presents the corresponding changes when revenue neutrality results from a tax exemption 
increase for everybody (IR3). The changes are much smaller than those reported in Figure 4b for all 
countries except the Netherlands where lower income groups gain and higher income groups lose, 
quite substantially. The extended income of the top quintile declines in all countries (the effect is 
very small in Greece). In general, the middle quintiles gain the most and the effects are very small in 
the bottom quintile.  
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Table 6 reports changes from the baseline (distribution of extended disposable income) in three 
inequality indices – Gini, Atkinson(0.5) and Atkinson(1) – for the three aforementioned scenarios.22 
Naturally, the first-order distributional outcomes depend on the combination of a number of factors, 
such as the share of net imputed rent beneficiaries in the population and their location in the 
distribution of disposable income, the progressivity of income taxation and the treatment of 
mortgage interest payments in the baseline tax system. 
 
FIGURE 4 
Change in average household disposable extended income per quintile when net imputed rent is 
treated as taxable income 
(a) IR1: no revenue neutrality 
 
(b) IR2: revenue neutrality through a tax rate reduction 
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
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BE DE GR IT NL UK
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
 
 (c) IR3: revenue neutrality through a tax exemption increase 
                                                          
22
 These indices are widely used in distributional studies. They satisfy the axioms of symmetry, population 
independence, income-unit independence and the Dalton-Pigou principle of transfers and, in comparison with 
other indices of inequality, the Gini index is relatively more sensitive to changes in the middle of the 
distribution, while the Atkinson(0.5) and Atkinson(1) indices are relatively more sensitive to changes close to 
the top and bottom of the distribution, respectively (Cowell, 2000; Lambert, 2001). 
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Note: Quintile groups defined on the basis of household equivalised disposable cash income.  
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD version D25 with net imputed rent estimates as in Frick et al. (2010). 
According to the results reported in Table 6, the countries included in our analysis show different 
levels of inequality of the distribution of extended income as measured by Gini indexes ranging from 
0.23 in Belgium to more than 0.30 in Greece, Italy and the UK. The inclusion of imputed rent in the 
concept of taxable income (IR1) results in inequality declining in all countries under examination. 
The effect is strongest in the Netherlands and smallest in the United Kingdom. This is expected given 
the progressivity of the tax schedules in these countries and the regressive pattern of mortgage 
interest tax relief in the countries where it exists. In addition, the evidence of Table 5 showed that 
the proportional changes in disposable income and personal income tax revenue after including net 
imputed rent in the concept of resources are larger in the Netherlands than in the other countries 
included in our analysis, and the evidence of Figure 4a implies that the increase in taxes is very 
unequally distributed across quintiles – the higher the quintile the higher the proportional decline in 
disposable income due to taxing net imputed rent. On the contrary, the corresponding aggregate 
changes for the UK in Table 5 are relatively small and the evidence of Figure 4a suggests that the 
proportional effect of the policy change was very similar in all quintiles apart from the bottom. 
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TABLE 6 
Proportional changes in inequality when net imputed rent is treated as taxable income 
  
  
Baseline 
Net imputed rent in 
taxable income, no 
revenue neutrality (IR1) 
Revenue neutrality 
through a tax rate 
reduction (IR2) 
Revenue neutrality 
through a tax 
exemption increase 
(IR3) 
Gini 
BE 0.227 -2.1% 2.9% -1.4% 
DE 0.270 -1.3% 0.0% -1.1% 
GR 0.304 -1.6% 1.4% -0.4% 
IT 0.301 -1.2% 1.0% -1.9% 
NL 0.248 -2.6% 2.6% -4.8% 
UK 0.307 -0.6% 0.9% -0.6% 
Atkinson (0.5) 
BE 0.045 -3.5% 6.3% -2.3% 
DE 0.059 -2.5% 0.1% -2.2% 
GR 0.078 -2.8% 3.3% -0.8% 
IT 0.079 -2.0% 2.0% -3.1% 
NL 0.051 -4.8% 5.5% -8.6% 
UK 0.077 -1.1% 2.0% -1.1% 
Atkinson (1) 
BE 0.092 -3.7% 5.8% -2.0% 
DE 0.114 -2.4% 0.0% -1.9% 
GR 0.150 -2.8% 2.4% -0.7% 
NL 0.100 -5.0% 4.4% -8.4% 
IT 0.147 -2.6% 1.5% -3.1% 
UK 0.143 -1.2% 1.6% -1.0% 
Note: Baseline refers to the distribution of extended equivalised disposable income.  
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD version D25 with net imputed rent estimates as in Frick et al. (2010). 
 
 
In contrast, when we introduce revenue neutrality through a tax rate reduction (IR2) inequality rises 
as the benefits accrue mainly to population members belonging to the top quintile (see Figure 3b). 
Since in this scenario most of the changes take place close to the top of the distribution, it is not 
surprising to observe that the largest increases are recorded when Atkinson(0.5) is used as index of 
inequality. Again, the largest effects are observed in Belgium and the Netherlands, while the smallest 
ones in Germany, where the values of the inequality indices barely change as a result of the policy 
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reform. The latter is consistent with the evidence of Figure 4b where, unlike the rest of the countries 
included in the analysis, in Germany the income share of the various quintiles hardly changes after 
the policy change. For Belgium and the Netherlands, this relates to the strong progressivity of the tax 
system, which in Belgium is partly due to existing refundable tax credits for low incomes. When we 
impose revenue neutrality through a tax exemption increase (IR3), inequality declines irrespective of 
the index used. Consistent with the evidence of Figure 4c, the decline is largest in the Netherlands 
(around -8.5 per cent according to the two Atkinson indices) where the disposable income of the 
poorest quintile rises the most, and smallest in Greece (around 0.6 per cent) and the United 
Kingdom (around -1 per cent) where quintile shares hardly move after the policy change. 
2. Beyond first-order distributive effects 
These first-order distributional effects are only part of the story, as we can expect that the taxation 
of net imputed rents might also affect the housing market and induce residential mobility. It is likely 
that the proposed scenarios will change both the owner occupied housing and rental market 
equilibria. On the one hand, the relative cost of renting compared to homeownership will be 
affected, while on the other hand, these policies might also impact housing prices. 
First, the taxation of net imputed rent increases the user cost of homeownership23, hence reducing 
the net gain from homeownership and making renting a more attractive tenure option. In terms of 
residential mobility, we expect this to result in housing demand shifting towards the rental market, 
at least in a first stage. However, the increased attractiveness of renting may also lead to an increase 
in rental market prices, assuming housing supply is slower to react, thus moderating the net income 
gains for renters and the distributive effects described in the previous Section. In the absence of rent 
regulation, especially the poorest households, that exhibit more price elastic behaviour, could 
indeed be adversely affected by the increase in rental market prices, even more so if the supply of 
rental housing is inelastic. In this case the inequality-reducing effect of removing the favourable tax 
treatment of homeownership could then be lower after adjustments in market prices, calling for 
policy attention and possibly for intervention (e.g. in the form of social housing or regulation) aimed 
at protecting the most vulnerable population groups. If, however, the supply of rental housing is 
elastic, higher rental prices may result in an increase in the supply of rental housing, and this would 
in turn have an impact on prices, possibly limiting the aforementioned adverse distributional effects.  
Second, we might also expect to observe changes in the asset price of housing in the longer term. A 
number of studies point out that the favourable tax treatment of homeownership tends to 
encourage excessive leverage and is capitalized into house prices, especially when the supply of 
housing is inelastic (Harris, 2010; Andrews, Caldera Sánchez and Johansson, 2011). The supply of 
housing in the European countries that we consider is indeed known to be quite inelastic (for 
example, in comparison with the US), because of high population densities, strict spatial planning 
and/or lower efficiency in the land-use regulation system (Green et al., 2005; Andrews, Caldera 
Sánchez and Johansson, 2011). This means that the tax advantages, intended to make home 
acquisition more affordable, are to a large extent beneficial to sellers and far less to buyers. Thus, we 
may expect the removal of preferential tax treatment to contribute in moderating (or even reducing) 
                                                          
23
 For example, Poterba and Sinai (2008) provide evidence on this for the US. 
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house prices in the longer run. Whether this will lead to changes in households’ tenure status is hard 
to assess, as it depends on the magnitude of the price effect, as well as on the elasticities in property 
and rental markets. Assuming inelastic housing supply, the ownership rate is unlikely to increase, 
although existing studies reach contrasting conclusions (Rosen and Rosen, 1980; Berkovec and 
Fullerton, 1992; Gervais, 2002; Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf, 2009). Moreover, the tax policy 
changes could affect not only prices and tenure status, but also the quality of housing; Glaeser and 
Shapiro (2003) show that removing favourable housing tax treatment could result in reductions in 
the size of owned houses, rather than in changes of tenure status. A thorough analysis of the overall 
long term distributional consequences of the policy changes we have simulated would require a 
general equilibrium approach, and a thorough assessment of the assumptions that best represent 
each country-specific setting, and as such remain beyond the scope of this work.  
Besides the housing and rental markets, as our tax reforms change disposable income, there might 
also be effects on work incentives. Therefore, we investigate the extent to which the taxation of net 
imputed rent and the shift of taxation from cash income to property implied by the revenue neutral 
scenarios can have a first-order effect on work incentives. We present marginal effective tax rates 
(METRs) that are indicative of the marginal tax burden on labour income. The METR is defined as: 
METR = 1- ΔYj/ di 
where di is the earnings increment for individual i and Yj is the disposable income of household j to 
which this individual belongs. We follow the standard practice in the literature (Immervoll and 
Sutherland, 2005) which considers the effective tax rate in terms of direct taxes (and cash benefits) 
as these have a direct impact on disposable income.24 The METR is calculated for each working age 
individual with earnings in the household in turn, taking into account any change in household 
income after a marginal increase in individual’s gross earnings.25 Table 7 presents average METRs by 
income quintiles for each scenario. 
When net imputed rent is taxed (and existing mortgage interest relief abolished) without 
compensating measures (IR1), the average METR increases in all quintiles. This is due to the 
progressivity of the income tax schedules: the tax base is increased by the inclusion of net imputed 
rent. When revenue neutrality is achieved through a tax rate reduction (IR2), the average METR 
decreases in comparison with scenario IR1, with higher reductions in the top quintiles. In all 
countries, the average METR in the top quintile shifts below its baseline value, while the opposite is 
observed in the bottom of the distribution, except in the Netherlands.  
Taxation of net imputed rent combined with a tax exemption increase (IR3) lowers the average 
METR, for the overall sample considered in the analysis, relative to the baseline (except in the 
Netherlands), but does so to a lesser extent than under scenario IR2 and the pattern over the 
                                                          
24
 In principle, the METR could also include consumption taxes, though their effect would depend on 
assumptions regarding the marginal propensity to consume. For example, if additional net income is assumed 
to be fully consumed by all population groups then the inclusion of consumption taxes in the METR would 
have a small effect on relative differences between the scenarios. Note that the implications of modified 
returns to savings due to the imputed rent taxation on consumption and work are out of scope of the present 
paper. 
25
 The increase is 3%, corresponding approximately to an additional hour of full time work per week.  
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income distribution generally reverses. Relative to the baseline, METRs are generally lower in the 
bottom quintile while they are similar or higher at the top of the income distribution. Exceptions are 
the Netherlands, where METRs increase in the bottom quintile, and Greece where, as in scenario 
IR2, they fall most for households with high incomes. While in the Netherlands IR3 appears to 
involve a trade-off between inequality reduction and higher marginal rates, especially for those with 
high incomes, there are instances in most of the countries of reductions in the marginal tax burden 
on labour incomes, especially for low income individuals, potentially reinforcing the day-after 
favourable distributional impact of the taxation of net imputed rental income. 
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TABLE 7 
Proportional changes in average METRs, by quintile groups of equivalised disposable income 
    Baseline 
Net imputed rent in 
taxable income, no 
revenue neutrality 
(IR1) 
Revenue neutrality 
through a tax rate 
reduction 
(IR2) 
Revenue neutrality 
through a tax 
exemption increase 
(IR3) 
BE Bottom quintile 46.6 6.9% 1.5% -6.4% 
 2 56.5 4.6% -2.5% -2.1% 
 3 54.9 2.4% -6.0% -1.5% 
 4 53.3 1.3% -7.1% -0.4% 
 Top quintile 54.0 0.6% -8.1% 0.4% 
  All 53.9 2.0% -6.3% -0.9% 
DE Bottom quintile 39.9 2.8% 1.5% -4.3% 
 2 43.7 1.1% -1.6% -3.4% 
 3 44.5 1.1% -2.2% -1.8% 
 4 45.3 1.1% -2.6% -0.7% 
 Top quintile 47.6 0.8% -3.8% 0.2% 
  All 44.9 1.1% -2.2% -1.6% 
GR Bottom quintile 6.8 25.0% 17.6% -1.5% 
 2 14.1 19.1% 9.2% -2.1% 
 3 18.7 15.0% 3.2% -1.1% 
 4 24.9 9.2% -3.2% -4.0% 
 Top quintile 34.2 3.5% -11.1% -3.8% 
  All 22.8 8.8% -3.9% -3.5% 
IT Bottom quintile 25.2 6.0% -0.4% -7.9% 
 2 35.0 2.3% -5.4% -4.9% 
 3 36.7 2.2% -6.0% -2.7% 
 4 38.8 1.3% -7.2% -1.3% 
 Top quintile 42.0 1.0% -7.9% 0.0% 
  All 37.0 1.9% -6.5% -2.2% 
NL Bottom quintile 39.5 3.0% -1.5% 0.8% 
 2 37.7 1.1% -8.5% -0.3% 
 3 34.7 2.0% -9.8% 0.6% 
 4 37.6 2.4% -12.8% 2.4% 
 Top quintile 40.4 2.7% -17.3% 2.5% 
  All 38.0 2.4% -11.6% 1.6% 
UK Bottom quintile 54.3 3.5% 1.3% -0.7% 
 2 51.1 1.0% -2.0% -2.5% 
 3 34.5 0.6% -3.8% -3.2% 
 4 31.8 0.9% -4.1% -1.6% 
 Top quintile 33.8 1.8% -4.1% 1.2% 
  All 36.6 1.4% -3.6% -1.4% 
Note: Marginal effective tax rates (METRs) are calculated for each working age individual (18-64 included) with positive 
earnings. Quintile groups defined on the basis of household equivalised disposable cash income. 
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD version D25 with net imputed rent estimates as in Frick et al. (2010). 
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V. Conclusions 
Identifying policy measures able to improve fiscal balances, with no detrimental effects on income 
inequality, is particularly valuable in times of economic downturn and fiscal crisis. In a number of 
countries, tax reforms removing provisions favouring homeownership were implemented under 
similar circumstances in the past; for example after the recession of the early 1990s, when some EU 
countries reduced deductibility of mortgage interest expenses. Following the economic crisis in the 
end of the 2000s, austerity measures adopted in several European countries consider housing 
taxation as one of the ingredients in the corresponding fiscal consolidation packages (Avram et al., 
2013). 
Still, the tax treatment of housing is far from representing an area where economic principles lead to 
unambiguous conclusions on tax design, mostly due to the multi-faceted nature of housing, which 
can be regarded as a form of investment, but also as a consumption good. In this study, we have 
considered the income tax treatment of the main residence focussing on the investment nature of 
owner occupied housing. While the net return on owner occupied housing investment represents, 
on average, a non-trivial proportion of the cash income typically used as a basis for personal income 
taxation, it is currently entirely or partially tax exempted in most western countries, leading to a 
homeownership bias in income taxation. 
This paper investigated the fiscal and distributional consequences of correcting the income tax 
homeownership bias through the inclusion of net imputed rent in taxable income in six European 
countries (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and United Kingdom), that vary 
considerably in their housing market characteristics and their joint distribution of housing tenure 
and cash disposable income. When considering the option of taxing net imputed rent, one concern is 
that income inequality might be adversely affected. While consensus on the regressive nature of 
mortgage interest relief schemes has been reached, there is a concern that net imputed rent 
taxation may not necessarily be progressive; for example, in countries where older people have 
higher net imputed rents (having paid off their mortgages) but lower cash incomes than the rest of 
population.  
Using existing micro-level estimates of net imputed rent, tax incidence analysis was conducted with 
the multi-country tax benefit model EUROMOD, exploring three scenarios. First, we considered a 
non revenue-neutral scenario, where net imputed rent was included in the tax base, while the 
existing taxation of cadastral income and existing housing related tax expenditures (mainly mortgage 
interest tax relief) were abolished, with the aim of conducting an absolute tax incidence analysis. 
The outcome of this scenario is that horizontal inequities between homeowners and tenants, as 
residence occupiers, are removed, thus making the tax system more horizontally equitable. 
Moreover, the results provide evidence of a small inequality-reducing effect of net imputed rent 
taxation, which is strongest in the Netherlands and weakest in the United Kingdom, but consistent 
across countries. At the same time, due to the progressivity of the income tax schedules, the 
inclusion of net imputed rent in the tax base reduces labour market incentives and also implies a 
non-trivial increase in personal income tax revenues, ranging from about five per cent in Germany 
(where a large proportion of the population lives in rented accommodations) to almost thirty per 
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cent in the Netherlands (due to the abolition of the very generous existing mortgage interest tax 
relief).  
While additional fiscal revenues, raised without increasing income inequality, are of great interest to 
several European countries currently facing severe fiscal imbalances, other countries might be more 
interested in tax reforms capable of shifting the burden away from labour, thus increasing work 
incentives. Results obtained regarding the differential tax incidence analysis of the revenue neutral 
scenarios have shown how housing taxation could offer a promising avenue in this respect. The way 
in which the additional tax revenues are returned to taxpayers – through a tax rate reduction for all 
taxpayers or through a tax exemption increase – turns out to affect crucially the distributional 
assessment of net imputed rent taxation in our simulations. Our empirical evidence shows that 
taxation of net imputed rent is pro-rich when combined with a tax rate reduction; while a tax 
exemption increase reduces inequality, with gainers mostly situated in the middle of the income 
distribution. Marginal effective tax rates on earned income in general increase when net imputed 
rent is taxed, but this effect is largely counteracted in the budget-neutral scenarios. Although the tax 
rate reduction lowers the marginal burden of tax on labour incomes on average by more than the 
tax exemption increase, the largest reductions were encountered among people in high income 
households. The tax exemption increase scenario led to a decrease in METRs for people with low 
household incomes in all countries but the Netherlands, indicating that such a shift in tax burden 
from labour income to housing can lead to improved work incentives for these individuals. 
Taxing net imputed rent may not only affect work incentives, but it can also impact on incentives in 
other domains most notably on the housing market. Taking account of these effects in our 
simulations is currently not feasible, but existing evidence suggests that a positive housing demand 
shock in countries with a more generous mortgage interest tax relief typically translates into higher 
housing prices than in countries without such relief (Andrews, Caldera Sánchez and Johansson, 
2011). Hence, we might expect that reforms such as those simulated in this paper may in the longer 
run impact on the housing market and induce residential mobility. On the one hand, our scenarios 
are likely to change the relative user cost for renters compared to homeowners, thus likely leading 
to new owner occupied housing and rental market equilibria. On the other hand, in the longer run 
equilibrium prices in both the owner occupied housing and the rental market might be affected, 
possibly impacting home tenure and capital allocation decisions. However, the analysis of these 
effects and the further implications of modified returns to investment on present and future work 
and consumption decisions, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
From a practical point of view, the taxation of net imputed rents would entail several administrative 
challenges. One would concern the accurate measurement of net imputed rents in practice. 
Moreover, short term liquidity constraints for homeowners26 and political economy considerations 
certainly represent a challenge to implementing net imputed rent taxation. Still, the paper has 
demonstrated that abolishing the homeownership bias inherent in personal income taxation 
appears to be a promising avenue for raising additional revenues, with no adverse inequality side-
                                                          
26
 It is worth referring here to the Danish system, which allows people in specified circumstances to roll up 
liabilities (with interest) either until the property is sold or until death, in order to alleviate such cash-flow 
problems (Mirrlees et al., 2011). 
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effects to be envisaged, or reducing the taxation of labour with an enhancement of work incentives 
and distributional consequences depending on the way in which the additional tax revenues are 
returned to taxpayers. Our results provide useful insights on the likely fiscal and distributional 
consequences of following such a route. Also, they show how cross-county variation in housing 
market characteristics, marginal income tax rates and cash income distributions across tenure types 
are likely to play major roles in shaping the fiscal and distributional effects of housing taxation 
reforms. 
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